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pessimism and optimism on this matter. The doctrines of original sin and
total depravity don’t encourage a rosy outlook among those hoping that
their proposed guidance for inquiry will result in actual improvements on
a large scale. But the doctrines of divine grace and the indwelling of the
Holy Spirit are more encouraging on this score. In any case, despite this
concern (and with or without Christian teaching), it seems wise and valuable for epistemologists and others to try to do what we can to improve
human inquiry (including our own) even if the prospects of widespread
success often seem dim. In my view, Ballantyne has not only tried hard
to do this, he has (in Knowing Our Limits) succeeded at providing us with
usable advice that will improve our inquiry if only we can discipline (or
otherwise arrange for) ourselves to follow it.

The Lost Sheep in Philosophy of Religion: New Perspectives on Disability, G
 ender,
Race, and Animals, edited by Blake Hereth and Kevin Timpe. Routledge,
2020. Pp. xiii + 400. $155.00 (hardcover), $28.98 (e-book).
ANDREW W. ARLIG, Brooklyn College, CUNY
The Lost Sheep in Philosophy of Religion is a timely and significant contribution to contemporary philosophy of religion. It is the product of a concerted effort to include more voices and perspectives and to expand the
range of topics addressed by philosophers of religion, especially by those
who practice it in Anglophone and thus primarily “analytic” departments
of philosophy. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this volume includes a significant
number of contributions by up-and-coming, early career philosophers,
and hence, it also provides us with an exciting glimpse of the future of the
philosophy of religion.
The volume consists of an introduction by the editors, followed by
essays broken into five Sections. In the introduction, the editors helpfully
survey analytic philosophy of religion as it is currently practiced as well
as the main criticisms that have been launched against it both from within
and from the outside. Section I is entitled “Methodology” and it consists
of two pieces. The first is a fascinating summary and analysis of two focus
group discussions organized and directed by Helen De Cruz (chapter 1),
where she attempts to get a clearer picture of what it is like to be a member
of an underrepresented group who is currently working in philosophy of
religion. In the second contribution (chapter 2), Michelle Panchuk argues
that philosophy of religion should dispense with the pretense that the
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philosopher of religion ought to adopt an impersonal, objective standpoint
with respect to her chosen subject of inquiry. First, as Panchuk argues, it
is unclear whether there is such a standpoint. But more importantly, she
forcefully (and, in this reviewer’s opinion, convincingly) argues that even
if there were such a thing as a “God’s-eye perspective,” in many cases
doing philosophy from such a position would be morally harmful. These
essays make for riveting reading and together with the introduction they
develop a compelling case for transforming philosophy of religion as it
traditionally has been practiced. This part of Lost Sheep will also be a time
capsule of sorts, providing for future historians an enduring snapshot of
academic philosophy of religion at this crucial juncture in its evolution.
Section II consists of three essays dealing with broadly epistemological
themes. Kirk Lougheed (chapter 3) considers the possibility that persons
reporting religious experiences might on occasion be subject to various
forms of epistemic injustice. Joshua Cockayne (chapter 4) provides an
intriguing reflection on the way in which the sense of smell might provide a way to experience the presence of God, and thus to gain indirect yet “non-metaphorical” understanding of the divine. And Joshua
Blanchard (chapter 5) shows how certain cases of apparent “divine reversals” in Scripture should call into question our confidence that “God is
on our side.” Specifically, he leaves us with the important thought that
there seems to be “a hierarchy of divine ethical concern” (132), such that
acting with justice and compassion towards others is more central than
enforcing certain behavioral norms or “cultic practices” (132). Therefore,
“even if, in some ultimate sense, God wills a particular, narrow model of
human gender or sexual life, it may be that, for the time being and even for
quite a while, God not only permits but sanctifies alternative models that
serve the underlying values at issue” (133). This lesson, he hastens to add,
applies both to “conservatives” and to “liberals,” and thus his argument
has potentially wide-ranging ramifications for theologically based ethics,
both as it is debated by stakeholders and as it is applied by various religious communities.
Section III addresses several issues that directly pertain to non-human
animals. In chapter 6, Dustin Crummett argues for a form of “animal universalism,” such that all animals with “interests” will eventually receive
eternal, infinitely good afterlives. Faith Glavey Pawl (chapter 7) speculates
about whether animals might have conscious awareness of divine presence, and she provides some reasons to think that if an animal has even
a “limited Theory of Mind” (a concept she draws from psychology, and
which has been applied in primate studies, for instance) and “an ability to
detect other agents as individuals,” then it “might have some encounter
with God where it senses God’s presence or action” (177). Finally, Blake
Hereth (chapter 8) starts with the classical assumption that God is a maximally perfect being and argues for “zootheism,” that is, that “some divine
person is an animal.”
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Section IV concerns disability. The first two essays by David Efird
(chapter 9) and Kevin Timpe (chapter 10) offer reasons to think that at
least some disabilities will persist in the afterlife. Efird argues that God
has no reason either to eliminate or to retain physical disabilities, and
hence, it would seem fitting that individuals will have the option to be
resurrected with disabilities. Moreover, he argues, some individuals
might have rational reasons to make that choice. Timpe argues that we
have good reasons to think that among the heavenly goods are “beatified disabilities,” that is, physical and cognitive disabilities that have
been separated from the harms and badness that accompany them in the
present life. In the final chapter in the section (chapter 11), Scott Williams
examines a common contemporary notion of personhood, one which sees
rationality as an essential constituent of personhood, and he argues that
such a conception may lead to a form of ableism. Fortunately, he proceeds
to argue, this contemporary notion of personhood is far from self-evident, and indeed, as he shows in a brief history of the concept, the conception of a person as an essentially rational substance is a “theoretical
posit” developed for other purposes than to serve as the locus of personal
identity or moral worth.
Section V consists of five essays, each dealing with some aspect of
sex, gender, or race. Eric Yang and Stephen Davis (chapter 12) start
things off by considering two related questions. First, would it be morally impermissible for an incarnate God to take a spouse, have sexual
relations, or procreate? Second, even if it were morally permissible,
would it be “fitting” for an incarnate God to do so? Yang and Davis
argue that while it would be morally permissible, there are compelling
reasons to think that, all things considered (including and especially
the actual historical realities of first-century Palestine), it would not be
fitting for an incarnate God to be married or procreate. Kelli Potter then
provides a “transfeminist” critique of several contemporary Mormon
theologies of gender (chapter 13). Specifically, Potter argues that many
interpretations of the famous Proclamation of 1995 as well as the current official policies of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
lack solid theological footing but are instead grounded in patriarchal
and heteronormative prejudices (320). Hilary Yancey (chapter 14) turns
to the matter of whether bodies will be gendered in the afterlife. She
argues that resurrection requires not only a new age of complete justice,
but also “a final (and full) rectification of the injustice suffered in this
life” (331). The only way to bring about this full, final rectification is for
individuals to be resurrected with bodies that have gender. Therefore,
in the life to come individuals will have gendered bodies. In chapter 15,
David Worsley takes as his starting point a conception of limbo developed by Kevin Timpe in an earlier paper (“An Argument for Limbo,”
Journal of Ethics 19 (2015): 277–292) and in a subtle display of analytical
philosophical theology, he works out several surprising implications of
this picture. Finally, Sameer Yadav (chapter 16) develops an ambitious
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agenda for future research at the intersection of race theory and the
philosophy of religion. He argues that while we have learned much
in recent years about the complicated interplay between race and the
history of Christianity and its effects on racial identity in the broader
culture, many aspects of this story will remain underdetermined until
we apply the methods and concepts of contemporary social ontology to
the picture that is being developed. By applying the insights of current
work by Brian Epstein and others on the metaphysics of social entities, philosophers reflecting on the intersection between race and religion will be in a position to diagnose and ameliorate certain features of
Christian group identity that “anchor” contemporary racial identities
and thereby perpetuate certain structural injustices.
Lost Sheep is a refreshing addition to the field. It succeeds at bringing in a variety of new voices and perspectives—all the while, honestly
acknowledging that it fails by other measures at achieving diversity (e.g.
the essays all assume some form of theism and for the most part they
work within a Christian framework)—and the contributors outline several interesting and promising trajectories of future research. This, however, does not mean that more traditional concerns are discounted. Both
the editors and many of the contributors assert that there is nothing wrong
with discussions of, say, inquiries into the nature and attributes of God or
questions about the rationality of believing in divinity and its nature. In
fact, as many of these essays show, one can make exciting contributions
to longstanding debates and concerns precisely by expanding the scope of
philosophy of religion. For instance, as Crummett observes, the suffering
of non-human animals highlights specific shortcomings with many of the
standard answers given to the problem of evil (141). And both Cockayne’s
reflection on the sense of smell and Pawl’s speculations about animal
spirituality tie into larger concerns about how a transcendent being can
be perceived or experienced in any respect by finite beings. While he does
not note this, Cockayne’s essay also connects to current research on the
contemplative, or “mystical,” literature, and specifically, to research that
has pointed out what is arguably an overemphasis on the intellect and
the consequent dismissal by many philosophers of embodied religious
experiences (see, e.g., Christina Van Dyke, “What has History to do with
Philosophy? Insights from the Medieval Contemplative Tradition,” in
Philosophy and the Historical Perspective, edited by M. Van Ackeren (Oxford
University Press, 2018), 155–170).
A number of the essays in this volume draw upon novel insights, concepts, and methods developed and employed in other domains of analytic philosophy. As was already noted, Yadav refers to current work in
the metaphysics of social entities. Yancey’s essay also addresses some of
this literature, in particular, suggesting that certain irrealist metaphysical accounts of gender are incompatible with what she has argued is
the most probable picture of the afterlife that a committed Christian can
have (337f). Many others make profitable use of the notion of epistemic
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injustice, especially as it is formulated by Miranda Fricker in her seminal
book (Epistemic Injustice (Oxford University Press, 2007)). Several of the
essays, in fact, devote considerable space to canvassing these notions
and summarizing the state of the art. Perhaps for some these surveys
will seem to be unnecessarily didactic. But this reviewer sees their inclusion, as well as the substantial bibliographical references, as a virtue of
the volume. First, many of the book’s intended audience, that is, current
analytic philosophers of religion, might not be conversant with these
concepts or the corresponding literature. But second, and more importantly, these summaries of the state of the art make many of these pieces
ideal for undergraduate teaching. As De Cruz reports, several of her
focus group participants, despite wanting to do the right thing, found it
difficult to be more inclusive in their pedagogy (40–41). Some of this was
due to perceived expectations from students, but a large part of it had to
do with the narrowness of most of the current anthologies and surveys.
The appearance of this volume could begin to remedy this problem, as
many of these articles would be excellent additions to an undergraduate philosophy of religion syllabus. (This reviewer, for instance, will be
trying out the papers by Cockayne, Crummett, Pawl, Efird, and Yancey
in a current iteration of his undergraduate-level philosophy of religion
course. Although, this by no means is meant to suggest that these are
the only papers in the present volume that would be suitable for inclusion in undergraduate courses.) For that matter, many of these articles
could conceivably be included in other specialist courses (for instance,
Yancey’s article in a metaphysics or philosophy of gender course as a
litmus test for various accounts of the metaphysical status of gender) or
even in a carefully crafted introduction to philosophy. The accessibility
of the articles, however, does vary. Some are quite technical or assume a
thorough familiarity with the relevant literature, enough so in fact that
this reviewer would only countenance including them in more advanced
undergraduate or graduate-level curricula. This, to be sure, is not a criticism of Lost Sheep as such, as the volume was clearly not intended primarily to be a textbook. Rather, as the editors insist, this volume aims
to be only one modest contribution in a growing attempt to make the
discipline of philosophy, and philosophy of religion, in particular, more
diverse and inclusive, and thus more in step with the needs of present-day students and future generations of philosophers. Measured in
terms of that aim, the book is a resounding success.

